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Damages by the Portfolio Method 
 
Tullis Russell v. Inveresk 
 
This decision in Tullis Russell Papermakers Ltd v. Inveresk Ltd,1 forms but one judgment in an 
inter-related set of claims, one aspect of which (on the so-called remedy of "retention", ie the 
justified withholding of performance in response to another contracting party’s breach of contract) 
has already been the subject of a decision of the Supreme Court.2  
 The principal matter in this judgment of Lord Drummond Young, sitting in the Outer House 
of the Court of Session, was the assessment of the quantum of damages due by the defenders, 
Inveresk, for alleged breaches of contract. The judgment is of particular interest in its discussion of 
the valuation of trading losses due to damage to the goodwill attached to a business brand. 
Quantifying loss in such cases is usually a difficult exercise, not simply because of the ephemeral 
quality of goodwill but also because of the difficulty of demonstrating what precisely the 
counterfactual outcome would have been in the absence of breach of the contract. A legitimate 
question arises as to whether anything other than a highly speculative figure for lost profits due to 
the harm done to goodwill can be arrived at or whether some method (and if so, which) may 
provide a reasonably accurate assessment of the actual losses suffered.  
 It should at the outset be noted that, this being a Scottish action, the settled distinction in 
English law between general and special damages did not feature in the judgment. In Scots law, no 
such specific distinction has been drawn,3 the courts instead taking the view that, in any breach of 
contract action, all losses for which damages are sought must be enumerated in the written 
pleadings, each such item of loss must be quantified by the pursuer, and, in due course, a reasonable 
method of assessment for the specific quantum of loss claimed must be presented to the court at the 
relevant hearing.4 Lost profits due to a general reduction in trade as a result of harm to goodwill can 
therefore be included as a head of damages in a Scottish action, and the inclusion of such a head of 
damage has not in Scotland historically raised the sort of theoretical difficulties that troubled the 
King’s Bench Division in Aerial Advertising v. Batchelor’s Peas.5 Despite the absence of a 
general/special damages division in Scots law, one could, as a matter of fact, draw a distinction 
between those Scottish cases in which a specific pecuniary loss was claimed from those in which a 
general reduction in trading profits was claimed, even if such a distinction has not given rise to 
separate rules for the treatment of these two categories of claim. Drawing such a factual distinction 
can be argued to be useful because the method for quantifying loss approved by Lord Drummond 
Young in Tullis Russell will only need to be utilised where general trading losses are claimed. That 
being the case, it can be argued that the significance of Tullis Russell to both Scots as well as to 
English law is that it provides a more sophisticated methodology (the ‘portfolio method’ described 
below) for quantifying lost general trading profits as a  result of  damage to business goodwill than 
has hitherto been applied. Whereas the assessment of damages by Atkinson J in Aerial Advertising 
was suggested by the court to offer only a rough estimate of losses, the ‘portfolio method’ is likely 
to appeal to courts in the future as offering a much more accurate measurement for quantifying lost 
general business profits.  
 Prior to the Tullis Russell decision, there had been little in recent years by way of reported 
Scottish decisions on the calculation of goodwill (and consequent damage to goodwill), the 
                                                 
1 [2010] CSOH 148 (Ct Sn: OH). 
2 Inveresk Plc v Tullis Russell Papermakers Ltd [2010] UKSC 19; 2010 SCLR 396; 2010 SLT 941 . 
3 This may be indicated by consulting the standard academic work on Scots contract law, W M McBryde’s The Law of 
Contract in Scotland, 3rd ed (2007). There are only two mentions of the term ‘special damages’ in the entire work, and 
both of these are passing references to the English judgments of Wadsworth v. Lydall [1981] 1 WLR 598 and President 
of India v. La Pintada Cia Navigacion S.A. [1985] AC 104. 
4 In addition, the rules concerning causation of loss and remoteness of damage applicable in an English claim are 
equally applicable in Scottish actions. 
5 [1938] 2 All ER 788. 
  
comment by one judge in a previous case that “[v]aluation of it is not easy”6 being very reminiscent 
of the concerns raised by Atkinson J which resulted in his rough and ready attempt at quantification. 
As McGregor on Damages explains, a claim for damages for pecuniary loss flowing from damage 
to business reputation has only been permitted by the courts in restricted instances, the 
characteristic linking such recognised instances being that "the loss was particularly contemplated 
by the parties".7 Claiming for such a head of loss resulting from damage to goodwill was not 
problematic in Tullis Russell, as the contract of sale of the branded goods in question had 
specifically included the goodwill associated with such brand: loss to goodwill was thus evidently 
within the class of loss that might reasonably have been contemplated by the parties as likely to 
arise in the event of breach of the contractual relationship. 
 The specific facts of the case were that Tullis Russell manufactured a specific type of coated 
solid board named ‘Trucard’, while Inveresk (in receivership by the time of the litigation)  
manufactured a similar type of board called ‘Gemini’. In 2005, Tullis Russell had agreed to 
purchase the Gemini brand and its goodwill, together with related customer information and other 
assets, it being agreed that, for a few months following the purchase, Inveresk would continue to 
manufacture Gemini under licence from Tullis Russell. The overall arrangement was embodied in 
two contracts, the Asset Purchase Agreement and the Services Agreement. Following the purchase, 
it transpired that the Gemini board manufactured and distributed by Inveresk was defective. It also 
became apparent that Inveresk had been dealing with customer complaints about such defects in a 
hostile manner, one likely to antagonise and alienate customers. The resulting sales of Gemini were 
much lower than Tullis Russell had expected, and they sued Inveresk for breach of contract, 
founded upon both the defects in the Gemini board as well as the antagonistic behaviour of Inveresk 
towards customers (behaviour which Tullis Russell alleged could be ‘regarded as striking at the 
fundamental purpose of the parties' transaction’8). Both breaches were argued to have affected the 
goodwill attached to the Gemini  brand, causing some customers to cease doing business with the 
pursuers entirely and other customers to reduce their level of orders or to decide not to transfer their 
business from the defenders to the pursuers. Both breaches were thus argued to have made a 
contribution to a cumulative loss, one presented by Tullis Russell as a ‘global claim’.9 A global 
claim has previously been described judicially10 as one  
 
‘in which the individual causal connections between the events giving rise to the claim 
and the items of loss and expense making up the claim are not specified, but the totality 
of the loss and expense is said to be a consequence of the totality of the events giving 
rise to the claim’.  
 
 Such claims have typically (though not exclusively) been advanced in construction cases, 
and are permitted so long as there is no significant cause of the global losses other than the 
behaviour of the party shown to be in breach.11 The benefit to Tullis Russell of mounting such a 
global claim was that they were not required to distinguish the extent of their losses due to the 
defective manufacturing by the defenders from the extent of their losses due to the defenders’ 
antagonistic treatment of customers, a distinction which would likely have been impossible to draw.  
While the defenders tried to argue that a global claim was unacceptable because a not 
inconsiderable portion of the loss was attributable not to their conduct but to the merger of the 
companies,12 Lord Drummond Young dismissed such a suggestion, holding that the significant 
                                                 
6 Per Sheriff Peter Anderson, in Gray v. Dickson, Sheriffdom of Tayside, Central & Fife at Perth, 10 August 2007 (Ref: 
A1116/05)(this judgment is available online at  http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/A1116_05.html ). 
7 McGregor on Damages, 18th ed (2009), [2.028]. 
8 At [49].  
9 At [65-66]. 
10 John Doyle Construction Ltd v. Laing Management (Scotland) Ltd 2004 SCLR 872, [4] (Lord Drummond Young). 
11 See, for an example of such a claim in a construction context, Merton LBC v. Stanley Hugh Leach Ltd (1986) 32 BLR 
51; 2 Const LJ 189. 
12 See at [66-71].  
  
causes of the loss were the two breaches of contract by Inveresk. Each such breach had contributed 
to a single, overall loss suffered by Tullis Russell.13 
 Turning to the heart of the judgment – the assessment of the business losses suffered as a 
result of damage to the brand’s goodwill – the alleged loss of profit was due to the behaviour of 
multiple existing clients (and potential clients which failed to materialise), so that uncertainty 
existed both as to whether specific contracts had been lost and, if they had, as to the value of such 
contracts. As remarked earlier, in such cases any attempt to determine counterfactual causation of 
loss can appear highly speculative. A number of questions may present themselves to a court 
dealing with such a case. Can a claimant in fact show, to the required level of proof (on the balance 
of probabilities), that, but for breach x, loss y would not have occurred? In posing this question (and 
bearing in mind the absence of a general/special damages distinction in Scots law), must it be asked 
individually of each established client (as well as of potential lost clients), or is some cumulative 
assessment to be attempted? Should evidence be taken from the clients themselves, or can one ask 
industry experts for an assessment? If causation cannot be demonstrated to the required level of 
proof, can loss of a chance (of securing contracts which were not won) be claimed, and, if so, at 
what level is the chance lost to be assessed? Most of these questions were addressed by Lord 
Drummond Young, though the lost chance issue was, as will be seen, thought not to arise. 
 Despite the lack of a recognised distinction between special and general damages in Scots 
law, the Scottish courts in effect allow what could be called general damages claims, by permitting 
claims for general harm to business. These do no not require specific losses to be connected to 
individual customers or potential customers.  Rather, the courts are willing in principle to accept the 
testimony of expert witnesses concerning alleged trading losses, and will assess the reasonableness 
of the methodology suggested by such witnesses: if a witness is deemed to have adopted a 
reasonable method, based upon sound assumptions, then the figures suggested by that witness will 
usually be accepted without an attempt by the court to substitute its own figures. As was remarked 
judicially in another relatively recent Scottish judgment on damages for general trading losses as a 
result of breach of contract:14 
 
‘Although it is possible for the court to make an assessment, in the light of the evidence, 
of how realistic or otherwise certain of the assumptions made by the expert witnesses 
may have been … the court lacks the expertise in valuation necessary to fix values in 
respect of every element in a calculation of that kind.’ 
 
 In the case before him, Lord Drummond Young, faced with the testimony of a principal 
expert witness led by each side, preferred the methodology of the witness led by Tullis Russell (a 
Dr Cuchra). Dr Cuchra’s suggested methodology for assessing loss was based upon taking a 
portfolio of Tullis Russell’s customers and comparing the actual profits derived from this portfolio 
with the counterfactual profits that would have arisen in the absence of the breaches (it being 
suggested that such profits should be determined on the basis of tonnage and margins).15 The 
suggested portfolio of customers was a wide one, Dr Cuchra being, in principle, of the opinion that 
"the analysis should be performed against the whole portfolio of customers acquired by the 
pursuers, without exclusion".16 
 This ‘portfolio method’ was suggested as preferable17 because: (i) it had the ability to 
capture commercial and economic linkages between different customers, including the implicit 
impact of brand and reputation; (ii) it was characterised by better statistical properties than the 
                                                 
13 At [92] (on the quality of the board), [127] (on dealings with customers) and [128] (summarising both breaches). 
14 Douglas Shelf Seven Ltd v. Co-Operative Wholesale Soc Ltd [2007] CSOH 53, [606] (Lord Reed).  
15 At [179]. 
16 At [181]. 
17 At [180]. 
  
alternative approach of attempting to assess estimates of damage for each customer;18 and (iii) it 
required the estimation of only one counterfactual scenario, which could be established with some 
certainty and cross-checked against a number of known and available benchmarks. By contrast, 
estimating separate counterfactuals for each customer was speculative unless a robust assessment of 
the likely evolution of demand for each individual customer could be performed. Points (ii) and (iii) 
are particularly noteworthy, as each seems designed to reassure the court that the result would be a 
sounder and more accurate establishment of the important element of causation of the loss. The 
attainment of accuracy in counterfactual outcomes is an appealing prospect for any court, as it 
enables damages awards to be presented as more than mere figures plucked from the air. In 
assessing the posited counterfactual, Dr Cuchra used as benchmarks factors such as historical sales 
to the acquired portfolio of customers, the performance of the market for paperboard, and the 
performance of a control group of comparable but unaffected customers.19 
 The alternative method of evaluating each customer’s counterfactual position separately was 
attacked by Dr Cuchra as severely methodologically flawed for a number of reasons:20 (i) it could 
not account for ‘cross-customer effects’ in the portfolio, in other words linkage of sales to one 
customer to sales to other customers, and it would both fundamentally contradict economic theory 
as well as be impossible to do robustly in practice; (ii) from a practical point of view, consideration 
of individual customers would not produce robust results—the impact of the wrongful act would 
require to be distinguished from a range of idiosyncratic factors applicable to individual customers; 
and  (iii) such an approach was open to speculation about the exact behaviour and decision-making 
process of each individual customer. Even the customers themselves might not be able to identify 
what would happen in the counterfactual scenario. 
 Having considered the counter-arguments, Lord Drummond Young preferred the portfolio 
method.21 In so deciding, he was particularly swayed by arguments about the linkage between 
customers, by the fact that the portfolio approach (especially where as large a portfolio as possible 
was selected) tended to cancel out idiosyncratic shocks which affected single customers, and by the 
impracticability of the individual customer assessment method. As to the latter, he made the 
important observation that, because, ‘according to the evidence, not all customers wished to discuss 
the decisions that they made, it would I suspect in practice be quite impossible to obtain a 
comprehensive view of which customers transferred business because of quality problems’.22 The 
emphasis on the practicability of the preferred method, and the impracticability of the alternative, is 
an important one to note for pleaders suggesting possible methods of assessing counterfactual 
losses. 
 Lord Drummond Young does not discuss the possibility of abandoning an attempt to assess 
counterfactual real-world damages and instead using loss of a chance analysis. Such analysis is used 
where all reasonable attempts to posit a counterfactual outcome produce only an indeterminate 
answer to the question ‘but for x, what loss y would have resulted?’, and it is quite clear from the 
judgment that such indeterminacy was considered not to arise in the case before the court; on the 
contrary, the methodology suggested by Tullis Russell was considered to produce a sufficiently 
determinate outcome for damages for the actual lost goodwill to be assessed.  
 The approach of Lord Drummond Young to the assessment of damages seems a reasonable 
one on the facts of the case. Given both the nature of the industry concerned (in which customers 
communicated frequently with each other, resulting in inter-customer causal linkage of loss), as 
well as the difficulty of obtaining accurate information from each customer about individual 
                                                 
18 This point was used to justify an argument that the portfolio approach gave a more accurate counterfactual outcome: 
the uncertainty around the counterfactual for a portfolio of customers was lower than the uncertainty around the 
estimates for individual customers, because idiosyncratic, company-specific factors that led to uncertainty around 
counterfactual estimates for individual customers were diversified when customers were considered on a portfolio basis, 
so that such factors tended to offset one another. 
19 At [183]. 
20 At [184]. 
21 At [217-218]. 
22 At [217]. 
  
counterfactual outcomes, a method for assessing damages based upon a calculation of the average 
portfolio figures for lost tonnage multiplied by margin (i.e. net profit) seems, of the two suggested 
methods, the one likely to have most nearly equated to the actual profits which the pursuers would 
have made had the defenders not breached their contract, as well as the most practicable method of 
the two. Any method for calculating losses based upon counterfactual human behaviour (such as 
decisions whether or not to purchase A’s goods rather than competitor B’s goods) will inevitably 
involve a degree of uncertainty,23 given the inherent unpredictability of human behaviour, but this 
need not invalidate judicial attempts to adopt that method for assessing damages which seems most 
successfully to minimise the indeterminate elements inherent in such an exercise. Lord Drummond 
Young is to be commended for a sensible and practicable approach, though the length of the 
judgment24 must serve to remind litigants of the complexity and inevitable expense which will be 
involved in the proof of damages in large value commercial actions involving trading losses caused 
to a medium to large customer base. That being said, the judgment is a positive development in the 
field of damages for harm caused to goodwill. While it rests upon a Scottish legal position which 
does not recognise a settled distinction between general and special damages, there is no reason 
why the ‘portfolio method’ adopted by the court could not be applied in an English contractual 
claim for general damages due to harm to goodwill. 
 
Martin Hogg* 
                                                 
23 As Lord Drummond Young notes in his conclusion on the assessment of damages (at [282]), ‘Inevitably, the figures 
produced by such a methodology are approximate, and I consider it appropriate to adopt a round figure.’  
24 The judgment runs to 319 paragraphs. 
* Edinburgh Law School 
 
